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10935

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an action by appellants (hereinafter plaintiffs)
on behalf of themselves and on behalf of other property

2

owners similarly situated for a preliminary injunction restraining and preventing respondents (hereinafter defendants) Salt Lake County, its officers and employees from
issuing any building or other permit which would affect
property controlled by an ordinance signed January 11, 1967,
which purportedly reclassified 1.22 acres of property located at the southeast corner of 2300 East and 4500 South,
.Salt Lake County, Utah, from Residential R-3 to Commercial C-1, and for an order invalidating the aforementioned
ordinance. The complaint alleges that defendants failed to
give notice of the proposed zoning as is required by section
17-27-17 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and as
guaranteed by the XIVth Amendment to the Federal Constiution and that the actions of defendants were arbitrary
and capricious.

,
1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was decided by the trial court following a
hearing on plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. ,
The court after making findings of fact concluded that the
notice procedure required by the Utah statutes was com·
plied with, that the amended zoning ordinance is valid,
that the temporary restraining order then in effect should be
vacated and that plaintiffs' complaint should be dismissed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiffs seek reversal of the judgment below
and a judgment in their favor based on the record made
before the trial court or, if the court finds that additional
ts'
facts are necessary to determine whether the def endan

3
decision results in unlawful "spot zoning" then for remand
of the case to the District Court for development of a
trial record on this issue.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about Novemb€r 3, 1966, Bill Roderick, Inc.
applied to amend the zoning map of Salt Lake County by
reclassifying property located at 21300 East and 4500 South
from Residential R-3 to Commercial C-1. (Def. Ex. D-20)
The Zoning Administrator's staff, the zoning subcommittee and the County Planning Commission on November 18, 1966, unanimously recommended that the application b€ denied. 1 A so-called hearing on the application
before the Salt Lake Board of County Commissioners was
scheduled for December 28, 1966. Between November 23
and November 26, 1966, the county purported to give notice of this hearing by affixing two pieces of paper to
utility poles near the subject property, one piece of paper
on a posting board at the west steps of the City and County
Building in Salt Lake City, Utah, and by a single newspaper
publication. (R. 26, 30, 155) No other notice was given.
On or about December 28, 1966, Marvin G. Jensen,
W. G. Larson and John Preston Creer, who were then the
duly elected and qualified Commissioners of Salt Lake
County purported to adopt an amendment to the zoning
ordinance making the requested change, subject to final
approval at a later date. (Def. Ex. D-35)
-~November 21, 1966, the zoning office r~ceived a writing purporting to approve the application from a smgle member of the
Holladay District Planning Commission. (R. 4)
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Subsequent to December 28, 1966, citizens and owners
of dwellings in the area surrounding 2300 East and 4500
South first learned of the hearing and the action of the
Commission; on January 10, 1967, they presented to the
Commission a written petition requesting reconsideration
of the zoning change and asking for an opportunity to be
heard. (Pl. Ex. P-48) The written petition was presented
to the newly elected Commissioners, Oscar Hanson, Jr. and
Philip Blomquist. (R. 128) At that time the purported
zoning change was not in effect.
The following morning, January 11, 1967, Commissioner
Blomquist, acting as temporary chairman of the Salt Lake
County Commission (in the absence of Chairman Hanson)
signed an ordinance purporting to place into effect the
amendment of section 8-10-4 of the Revised Ordinances of
Salt Lake County to reclassify the subject parcels of property from Residential R-3 to Commercial C-1. (Def. Ex.
D-39)
Pursuant to a prior appointment, Holladay citizens appeared at the Commission's January 17, 1967, meeting to
present their position. However, they were informed by
the Commissioners that the ordinance had been signed and
that consequently the matter would not be reconsidered or
reheard.
PLAINTIFFS' POSITION
The trial court's decision should be reversed since the
ordinance attempting to change the zoning of the subject
parcels at 2300 East and 4500 South is invalid in the fol·
lowing particulars :

1
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1. Defendant county lacked jurisdiction to hear
the matter on December 28, 1966, because it failed to
give adequate notice of the hearing to interested persons as required by law.
2. Even if the applicable notice statute were complied with, the procedure undertaken by Salt Lake
County to give notice to affected property owners was
so inadequate that the action of the County based
thereon deprives such owners of rights guaranteed by
the Due Process clauses of the Federal and Utah Constitutions.
3. In addition to failing to give adequate notice
defendants failed to observe other statutory and procedural requirements and such failure invalidates the
attempted change of zoning.
4. The refusal of defendant County Commissioners
to permit interested property owners to be heard was
arbitrary, capricious and in contravention of their public trust and duty.
ARGUMENT
I.

SALT LAKE COUNTY HAS NEITHER INHERENT NOR UNLIMITED POWER TO AMEND
ZONING ORDINANCES.
Municipal corporations do not have inherent nower to
enact zoning regulations 1 nor does the Utah Constitution
bestow them such power.
1Tranfaglia v. Bldg. Comm'r of Winchester, 306 Mass. 495, 2.8
N.E. 2d 537 (1940).
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The power to regulate land for the health, welfare
and safety of the community is an attribute of police Power
which is delegated in the first instance to the state legislature. In turn, the state legislature, through enabling acts,
authorizes municipalities to regulate the use of land; but
it also imposes limitations upon the substance of such
regulation and upon the procedures used. Baker v. Switzer,
209 App. Div. 151, 205 N.Y. Supp. 108 (1924).
In Dewey v. Doxey-Layton Realty Co., 3 Utah 2d l,
277 P. 2d 805, 800 (1954), this Court quoting from Hurstv.
City of Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134, 277 Pac. 308 (1929) referred to the status assumed by a municipality in passing
zoning measures, as well as some of the critical procedural
conditions precedent to its exercise of this power:
When the statute requires notice and hearing as
to the possible effect of a zoning law upon property
rights, the action of the legislative body becomes
quasi judicial in character, and the statutory notice
and hearing then becomes necessary in order to satisfy the requirements of due process and may not
be dispensed with.
See DeLuca v. Bd. of Supervisors, 134 Cal. App. 2d
606, 286 P.2d 395 (Cal. 1955). 1
II.
SALT LAKE COUNTY FAILED TO GIVE ADEQUATE NOTICE OF THE HEARING TO BE
HELD DECEMBER 28, 1966, AS REQUIRED
BY LAW.
'A zoning ordinance is in derogatio,n of the co~on law. ~;1bi;
the procedural requirements for adoption and effectiveness .m Inc
strictly followed. Town of Greenburgh v. Bobandal Realties,
"
203 N.Y.S. 2d 328 (1960).
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Section 17-27-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended, provided:
Before finally adopting any such amendment
the board of county commissioners shall hold a
public hearing thereon, at least 30 days' notice of
the time and place of which shall be given by at least
one publication in a newspaper of general circulation
in the county and by posting in three public places
designed to give notice thereof to the persons affected.
This particular concept of notice has its roots in the
ancient English custom of attaching notice of various applications to the door of the church or chapel of any parish
in the licensing district. For example, the Beerhouse Act,
1830, s. 32 provides that notice shall be given as follows:
To insure that the persons likely to be affected
by the opening of a new inn should have proper
notice of the proposals and, as it is the people near
the site who will be affected, the nearest church being
the one they are likely to visit, is the one where
the notice should be put. A notice on the main church
of Burmingham, for example, near the city's centre,
relating to the new inn at the uttermost limits of
the city would seldom be seen by persons living
near the site of the proposed inn; it is likelier to be
seen by them if posted on a church in the area.
119 J.P. 829 (1955).
In more recent times the United States Supreme Court
has voiced itself on the purpose and method required in giving notice. At stated by Justice Jackson in Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 314
(1950):
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The fundamental requisite of due process of
law is the opportunity to be heard.
An elementary and fundamental requirement of
due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated under
all the circumstances to apprise interested parties
of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections. A notice
must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the
required information and it must afford reasonable
time to those interested to make their appearance.
[Emphasis added] 1
That an adjacent property owner is such an interested
party is the court's holding in Marculescu v. City Planning
Comm'n, 46 P.2d 308, 310 (Cal. 1935), 7 C.A.2d 371:
It needs no argument to show that an adja-

cent property owner is interested in the use to which
his neighbor may legally put his property, for obviously such use must affect the value of his adjoining property, either injuriously or beneficially.
Reiterated, Section 17-27-17 of the Utah Code provides
that notice be given by posting in three public places designed to give notice thereof to the persons affected. The
following discussion is centered on analyzing the intent of
this statutory mandate and in showing that the County
Commission failed to observe the notice requirements of
the section.
(a) The County Did Not Use an Adequate Mode or
Manner of Giving Notice.
1This court recently held in Gaywnd v. Salt Lake County, 11,Utah
2d 307 358 P 2d 633 (1961) that citizen-owners of dwellmgs m an
area t~ be aff~cted by a chan'ge of zoning are entitled to due process
of law.

At the hearing one witness, Mr. Evans, gave testimony
from which the court could find that the Zoning Administrator caused to be affixed on November 23, 1966, to the
probate notice board of the west steps of the City and
County Building a summary of several applications for
zoning amendments which were to be heard by the Salt
Lake County Commission on December 28, 1966. (Def. Ex.
D-55) This document was in two pages, the first page
being in regular type and entitled "Notice of Zoning." The
subject property was mentioned on the second page.
There is also some evidence from which the court could
find that on the 25th day of November, 1966, the Zoning
Administrator caused a separate piece of paper to be tacked
to each of the first two utility poles which run along the
east side of 2300 East south of the intersection of 4500
South and 2300 East. (R. 30-31) 1
Neither the County nor the intervenors could produce
a copy of the pieces of paper allegedly tacked to the utility
poles. The recollection of one witness, Mr. Clair Y. Hardman, was that the pieces of paper were of the usual form
used by the County (see Plaintiff's Exhibit 2) and contained
a legal description of the subject property. (R. 26)
The above described pieces of paper represent the
sum total of postings made by the County with respect to
the subject property.
(1) Postings Were Not Made at Publie Places as
Required by Law.
1The utility poles stand on a piece of ground which lies between
the street and the sidewalk.
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One of the posting requirements of section 17-27-17
is that notice be posted in public p'laces.
A public place is defined as one of public resort, i.e.,
where people frequently meet or have occasion to be. Hamm
Constr. Co. v. Dempster Bros., 36 Tenn. App. 356, 255 S.W.
2d 712 (1953). As expressed in Armstrong v. New LaPaza
Gold Mining Co., 107 F. 2d 453 (9th Cir. 1939):
We find no Arizona cases defining the term
"public place" but cases arising in other jurisdictions
are quite uniform in their definitions, and we are
certain that Arizona would follow. We quote the
definition contained in Words and Phrases, 2nd
Series, vol. 4, p. 23: "The term public place as used
in St. 1898, section 1130, providing for the posting
of tax sale notices in at least four public places in
the county, was used in its ordinary common sense
to designate a place where the public resorts, so that
the exposure of the document was likely to give notice." Bauchier v. Hammer, 140 Wis. 648, 123 N.W.
132, 134.
Practically no one frequents, meets, or has occasion
to be at a vacant lot (2300 East and 4500 South) during
the middle of the winter. True, cars pass by the poles,
but the probability that the occupants traveling 30 to 40
miles an hour could read a piece of paper posted to face
the street is extremely doubtful. Lake v. Riutcel, 249
S.W. 2d 450 (Mo. 1952).
Similarly no one who lives in Holladay frequents,
meets at or could reasonably be expected to be looking regularly at the west steps of the City and County Building
for notices of proposed change of zoning of real property
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located in Holladay, miles away. No reasonable governmental administrator could expect the "public" residing in
Holladay to stop at the west steps of the City and County
Building once each 30 days to look at legal descriptions to
learn if any proposed change of zoning affected their properties in Holladay. Until something draws the attention of
a property owner, he assumes that his property is safe.
A notice that his property is in danger must be reasonably
calculated to draw his attention; otherwise, he never learns
of it. The County and respondents would have us believe
that members of the "public" residing in Holladay would be
alerted by a legal description on the under-sheet of two
pieces of paper placed on the west steps of the City and
County Building. No reasonable man could believe such
to be so.
A public place is precisely that - a place where the
public meets; and, in the Holladay area there are many
such places, viz., post office, library, shopping centers,
churches, schools (see 90 A.L.R. 2d 1211). The County's
complete failure to post any notice in any public place frequented by Holladay residents is fatal to the requisite jurisdiction needed by the County in zoning matters.

(2)
Places.

Postings Were Made at Only Two, Not Three,

A second posting requirement of section 17-27-17 i~
that the notice be posted in three places.
Statutes requiring posting of three notices in public
places have been interpreted as meaning posting at three
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different geographical locations. 1 In Standley v. Knapp,
113 Cal. App. 91, 298 Pac. 109, 112 (Cal. 1931) the court
said:
In Corpus Juris, volume 23, at page 637, we
find as follows: "A public place, as the term is used
in the statutes, has been held to mean such a place
that an advertisement posted on it would be likely
to attract general attention so that its contents
might reasonably be expected to become a matter of
notoriety in the vicinity." In National Loan & Inv.
Co. v. Doren Blazer, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 148, at page
151, 69 S.W. 1019, the court holds that a statute
requiring that a notice of sale under a deed of trust
be given by posting written or printed notices thereof in three public places in the county where the sale
is to take place is not complied with by posting one
notice at the courtroom door, another on a telephone
pole at the northeast corner of the courthouse square,
and another on a telephone pole at the northwest
corner of the courthouse square. 2
The County's act of posting two notices at one place the east side of the corner of 2300 East and 4500 South amounted to one, not two, postings.
It is not the number of pieces of paper posted that

counts, but rather
they are posted.
complied with by
on a single pole.

the number of different places at which
The intent of the statute could not be
posting three separate pieces of paper
Nor should a similar result be gained

1Graham v. Fitts, 53 Miss. 307 (1876); Dacus v. Knoxville Out·
fitting Co., 9 Tenn. App. 683 (1929).
(lgS4)
'In In Re Howard's Estate, 2 Utah 2d 112, 269 P.2d 104~
e~
the Utah Supreme Court tacitly recognized tha! three pu~hc pl1c 1
means three different geographic locations. In this case, a will .con esd
proceeding, "notice was posted at the west e~trance to the City ~h
County Building, another on a public bulletm board on 33rd ~ird
and State Street, on which corner a church was located, and the
in the Murray Post Office."
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by posting two separate pieces of paper on adjacent poles.
At most, the county only posted notice at two places - viz.,
the City and County Building and one side of the corner
of 2300 East and 4500 South. 1
(3) Places of Postings Were .Not "Designed to Give
Notice Thereof to the Persons Affected" as Required by

Law.

The applicable statute does not stop with requiring
postings "in three public places." It contains an express
directive about where the postings must be. By statutory
mandate, the postings must be in three public places "designed to give notice thereof to the persons affected."
It is not to be supposed that the legislature, when
enacting this statute, intended this language to be meaningless. At a minimum, this language means some place
other than just any place which is not private or secret.

In defining what is a public place designed to give
notice, this Court has said:
The paramount controlling principle which
should guide the posting of notice [in probate matters] is that the two notices which are to be posted
other than at the courthouse should be placed in the
county at places most likely to reach parties inter1 The subject property consists of two parcels one at the southeast,
comer of the intersection of 2300 East and 41500 South and the other
at the Southwest corner of the intersection of 4500 South and _Russell
Street. Even though there are utility poles between the traffic lanes
of Russell Street and the east parcel of the subject _Propei:ty and on
the east side of the traffic lanes of Russell Street munediately east
?f the east parcel of the subject properties no piece of paper purportmg to give notice was affixed to any of these poles or to any other
place near the second parcel.

14
est~. . . . These should be customary places at
which all such n?tices should be posted, which places
should be conspicuously public points and not on th
byways. In re Phi~lips' Estate, 86 Utah 358, 44 P.2~
699, 703 (1935). [Emphasis added]

No greater "byway" exists to citizens living in the
vicinity of 2300 East and 4500 South than the west steps
of the City and County Building in downtown Salt Lake
City.
In Phillips' the court was concerned with the notice
provisions of the probate statute. That statute rationally
provides for posting at the courthouse, for it is there that
people interested in probate matters gather. But, with
zoning matters 1 nothing is further from the truth. Citizens
living and working in what is in effect a town within the
county - Holladay - have neither reason nor purpose for
gathering at or passing by a board located miles from their
daily activities. 2
More disturbing is that even if citizens interested in
this particular zoning matter by happenchance walked by
this board, the notice posted there would not catch their eye
as it was placed on a board clearly designated for "probate"
matters, was not in a form which would be likely to attract
1The zoning statute, unlike the probate statute, contains no speci·
fie directive that notice be posted at a courthouse.
2Even if it were assumed that those persons who live in the
Holladay Planning District would frequent the west steps of the
City and County Building, no one could ration,aJ.ly conclude thll;t s~ch
persons would be likely to wade through a senes of legal descnpt1t?ns
on pieces of paper tacked on top of each other on th~ probate postm!
board to determine whether there was to be _a hea_nn~ on a changd
of zoning of property in the Holladay Planmng D1stnct that woul
affect them. It tests the credulity of the mind for anyone to urge
that such a posting would be "designed" to give notice.
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attention and was "buried" underneath a cover sheet.
(Def. Ex. D-55)
The vice of the procedure of posting notice followed
by Salt Lake County is that none of the places at which
the postings are made are designed to give notice thereof
to the persons affected. More is required than mere token
compliance with the statute, It is not enough to say that
any public place would be "designed" to give notice. There
must be something of substance - some rational effect contemplated from the place chosen to give notice. 1
The posting in "byways" and nonfrequented "public"
places, coupled with a procedure by which flimsy pieces of
paper are affixed to utility poles and not subsequently policed (R. 146) cannot possibly be "designated to give notice
thereof to the persons affected." In fact, the procedure
of posting notices followed in the instant case is so inadequate that one wonders whether the notices posted were
1
Some attention should be given to the plight of an owner of land
in Salt Lake County. If the interested property owner (such as plaintiff Audrie Kennington) happened to know that a particular parcel
within the Holladay Planning District were under consideration, he
could watch that property. But, if the instant case is typical, he
would experience nothing but frustration because no notice was ever
placed on any part of the subject property inside of the boundary
fences. Further, whatever pieces of paper were tacked .to :itility poles
near one corner of one parcel of the subject property d1dn t stay there
very long, and would have been visible only if a particular utility pole
were viewed from a certain angle.

On the other hand, consider the person who has not been ~erted
by the rumor or otherwise that property- or for that matter. his <?wn
home - is the subject of an application for a change of zo~g filed
by someone who is not the record property owner. No notice ~ould
appear at any post office, shopping center, church, town _hall, ~1qu_or
store, library or other place within the Holladay Planrung D1stnct
where the public frequents or goes. Such person would h~ve to. m~e
monthly checks of every utility pole in the Holladay Planning District.
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designed so that home owners who would be affected would
not be informed.
(b) The Contents of the Legal Descriptions Which
the County Used in Attempting to Give Notice Were Not
Adequate.
Section 17-27-17, Utah Code Annotated, provides that
"thirty days' notice of the time and place . . . [of a public
hearing] shall be given by at least one publication in a newspaper . . ."
The whole pupose of this requirement is to inform actually to put on notice; it was not meant to be a mere
mechanical formality requiring only token compliance.
In describing what is required of a published notice,
the court said in Board of County Comm'rs of Sarpy County
v. McNally, 168 Neb. 23, 95 N.W. 2d 153, 160 (1959);
Notice is futile unless a property owner is able

to determine from such notice that his property is

or is not affected. This would seem to be the obvious
purpose of the statutory requirement for publication

The content of the notice is sufficient if it gives the average
reader reasonable warning that the property in which he
has an interest may be affected by the proposed zoning legislation and affords him an opportunity by the exercise of
reasonable diligence to determine whether such is the fact.
2525 East Ave. Inc. v. Town of Brighton, 33 Misc. 2d 1029,
228 N.Y.S. 2d 209 (1962).
The actual notice of the subject property appeared in
the Salt Lake Tribune on November 26, 1966, as follows:
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NOTIC• OP ZONING HEARING
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN OF
hearinq to be held in Room
206, Ci!Y. and County Building, Salt
Lake CitY, Salt Lake Counfy, Utah
on Wednesday, December 28, 1966, at
JO:OO a.m. o'clock before the Board
of County Commissioners of Sa It
Lake Countv on the fOllowln11 aoPll·
cations raquestin!l rezoning of the
following described areas In Salt
Lake County, Utah.
1. To amend the map of the
Sandy-Union-East Midvale Planning
District bv reclassifying the fol·
1owinf1 described property from Com·
merc1al Zone C-2 to Residential Zonr
R-2:
Beginning at the NE corner of the
SW
of Section '29, T2S, Rl E,
SLB&M; thence South 600'; thence
West 16'.'l' m. or I. to the center line
of 900 East Street; thence Northeast·
erly along said center line 850' m. or
I. to the Quarter Section line; thence
East along the Quarter line to beain·

a public

'I•

nino.

·

ra1n/ 0H~~~rsd m:n~g ~ls~~rctLcifv

reclassifying the following described
oroPertY from Residential Zone R-2A
to Residential Zone R-5:
Commencing 285' m. or I. North
from the Southeast Corner Lot 3,
Block 21, 10 Acre Plirt "A", Big

~~~t, ~~~~Yi00'1,h)~~~cew~~t jj~;

thence South 100' to beginning.
3. To a mend the map of the South
Cottonwood Planning District bY reclassifying the followina described
prooertv from Residential Zone R·2
to Commercial Zone C-1:

f&'1:.1N'

of 't~'W~1 1?n:to1a 1
s!'/eW.
said ooint belna North 29 dea. 51
min. 19 sec. West 074.37' and North
O deg. Zl min. East Zl4.'Jl' from the
SE corner of Section 17, T2S, RlE,
SLB&M1 running thence North O
deg. 27 min. East JOO' m. or I. to
fence line; thence westerlv along
said fence fine 523.12'; thence South

1

&~~.~h 0vii/ag~o s~~i~~f6~; 1m:ng!

Easterly along said line 526' m. or
l.1 thence North 131' m. or I. to
DOlnt of beginnin!l.
4. To amend the map of the
SDandv-Unlon-East Midvale Planning
istrict by reclusifyina the fol·

~e~\7~1 ~~~Jbe~-~oogtYc~~e~~r~i

Zone C-2:

·

N.;r%"ri.~~ 1 7~e 1 fe0.:t;t;e~I ~~~11b~ 2~:
1

T2S, RlE, SLB&M; thence East 366';
!Whence South 218' to canal; thence
NesterlY along canal 12.6'; thence

th~~~ 7Xe~~r1y51a1'ci'ni~. c'r/(vS:, 11t i~
6

?~~~ceNN'6t~h s8'f d::,:9i5' ~~'it 89
1m~

lh"f~ 4t~\W· v45 de~.n·1.f~ln fl~J
33'; thence East 158' to be!lfnnlng.
1.73 Ac.
5. To amend the map of the Cot·

tonwoo.d Plannlnq District bv re • 1
lassltying the following describ~
Pt roRcertv lr9m Residential Zone R·l Bl
o e~1d~nt1al Zone R·l:
Be.sinning . at a Doint created b
the intersection of the center 1ines ~
Donelson Lane (5165 South Street)
~~drt2h1003'East Street, said Point being
7 m. or I. and West 379' m
0l1._ I. from the Southeast corner oi
SeNorthwest 11• Of the Southwest
•,
ct1on 10, T2S, RlE, SLB&M·
th enc:e North 79 des
48 min
West 191' "'.'· or I.; thence North
2 dea. 46 min. SO sec. East 363 73'·
thence North 75 deg. 12 min 40 "sec
West 123.68'; thence North" 1 de ·
East 191.50'; thence East 305 06'
thhe center line of 2100 East street·
t ence South O dea 04 min East
;J~~fn~aid center line to Point of be6.
To llrnend
the mao of
th~ South CottonwoOd Plannlnq Dis·
trict by reclassifying the foliowing
dzescrlbed property from Residential
one .R·1 to Commercial Zone C-7·
.,.l\es1nn1ng 325' m. or I East and
~,. m or I. South from ihe NW corner of Section 16. T2S, RIE. SLB&M·
thence East. 551.02' to a coint on
3.:!..44.83' radius curve to the rlaht;
""'nee Southeasterly alona
said
cu_rve S.38'; thence South 19 deg. 26
min. East 201.88'; thence West
100.28; thence south 180 CO'; thence
East 1.50'.; thence South 541' to the
center line of 5600 South Steet1
thence West along said center line
687.06'; thence North O dell. 07 min
East 957' to beginning
·
B,C!linning 325' m.
I. East and
398
m. or I. South from the
NW corner of Section 16. T2S f'lE
SLB&~; thence East to the cen~
ter .ine of the Cottonwood Diagonal Expressway; thence South
19 deJI. 26 min. E?St along said center line to a 001nt Of intersection
with the center line of 5600 South
S.treet; thence West along the center
I 1ne of 5600 South Street to a ooint
due South Of beginninq; thence
North to the ooinl of beginning.
7. To amend the mao Of the Holladav Planninct Distict bv reclassifying
the followinq d<>scribed Prot>erty
from Residential Zone R·J to Commercial Zone C-1:
Commencing 253.09' South from the
center of Section 3. T2S, RlE,
SLB&M; thence Easterly alono a
1186.3' radius curve to the left .d60' m.
or I. to the center line of Russell
Street; thence South 8 deg. 25 min.
East 200' m. or I.; thence South 86
deg. 30 min. West 477.70' m. or I. to
the centor line ol 2300 East Street;
thence North to beolnning.
DATED THIS 23rd dav of Novern.
ber, 1966.
BOARD OF' COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS OF'
SALT LAKE COUNTY
BY MARVIN G. JENSON
Chairman
ATTEST:
BY JACO~ WEILER.
!C-78)
COUntv Clerk
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In Brachfeld v. Sforza, 114 N.Y.S. 2d 722, 725 (1952)
the court held:
A notice of hearing as the basis of a local ordinance should unambiguously set forth reasonable
information concerning the subject matter of the
hearing to the end that adequate warning be given
to all persons whose rights might be affected by action of the local board . . . What is said in Palmer
v. Mann ... is pertinent, to wit ... when a statute
requires a notice to be given to the public, such a
notice should fairly be given the meaning it would
reflect upon the mind of the ordinary layman and
not as it would be construed by one familiar with
the technicalities solely applicable to the laws and
rules of the zoning commission ... It is at least not
too much to ask that any ambiguity in a notice to the
public of so important a change, which is the only
notice that the public has, should be resolved against
the notice.
See also, Holly Development Inc v. Board of County
Commissioners of Arapahoe, 140 Colo. 95, 342 P.2d 1032
(1959).
An average person reading the above newspaper publication would be bewildered. 1 To him what does an apostrophe mean, where is the center of section 3, how large is section 3, what does T2S mean, what is RlE, what or where is
SLB&M, which way is a radius curve to the left, is it "m. or
l." or is it "m or one." 2
1To make things even more confusing, the so-called legal d~ci:iP·
tion fastened to the probate board at the City and County Bmld:ing
differs from the legal description contained in the newspaper pu_bli~·
tion. (Because the county could not produce a copy of the descnption
posted on the utility poles, there is no way of knowing its c~ntenf?.) d
'The so-called legal description used by the county. is so ma e·
quate and inaccurate that even lawyers and other prof~s1~nal ~rsM
would be confused. The cardinal rule for legal descriptions is t a
monuments take precedence over courses and distances and ~wer plats.
6 Powell on Real Property 202 (Section 890); Hofer v. Carino, 4 N.J.
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Super 244, _72 A.2d 335 (1950) (intersection of center lines of two
r~ds). It is fundll?Jlental that a complete and accurate legal descript~on shoul9- sta~ with a monument. But, the so-called legal description. contame9- m. the newspaper publication starts from the center of
section 3 Vl'.hich is not a monlJ!ll~nt at all. It is merely a dot on a
plat - a piece. of paper. In this mstance, the legal description should
~ave started with a monument such as the intersection of the center
line of 2300 East Street and the center line of 4500 South Street As
such the legal description would have read:
·
Commencing at the intersection of the center line of
2300 East Street and the center line of 4500 South Street
which point is about 253.09 feet south from the center of
section 3, Township 2 South, Range 1 East Salt Lake
Base and Meridian. . . .
'

If the ~egal ~escription had said nothing more than that much, a
reader immediately would have known that the property involved
was abutting the intersection of 2300 East and 4500 South Street
and would have been given a warning. Similarly, the legal description
should have continued by reference to physical monuments and should
have said:
. . . thence Easterly along the center line of 4500 South
Street on a 1186.3 foot radius curve to the left . . .
Again, if the legal description had been tied into the existing monument (4500 South Street), a reader would have been immediately
aware that 4500 South Street was involved. The legal description
to be adequate for a lawyer should have continued:
. . . 460 feet more or less to the intersection of the center
line of 4500 South Street and the center line of Russell
Street ...
Again, if the legal description had been tied into existing monuments in this manner, a resident on Russell Street near 4500 South
could have immediately determined that the property abutting the
intersection of Russell Street and 4500 South Street was to be the
subject of a change of zoning.
The so-called legal description which was used then continued:
. . . thence South 8 deg. 25 min. East 200' m. or l.; ...
The words did not say what m. or 1. meant. Even more important,
if "m." meant more and "l." meant less, the words did not say more
or less to what. The only proper way to use a "more or less" phrase
in an accurate legal description would b~ to say "m?re or less" to
a monument. This was not done. The distance on this course therefore could be any number of feet - as few as a score, or as many as
several hundreds.
It would not be possible, therefore, to determine with ce~tainty
where the next leg turned westward. Nor would it be possible to
work backwards from the last leg - the one that extended nort?ward
to the point of beginning. T~e reason i~ that this last !eg did not
reflect the distance from the mtersect with the center line of 2300
East Street to the point of beginning.
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While it is true that the language of the legal description
~efers to the center line of Russell Street and also the center
lme of 2300 East Street, the average reader would know that
both Russell and 2300 East Street are very long streets
and roug~ly yar.allel each other. And, because there is n~
language md1catmg what south street is involved, the reader
could reasonably suppose that the application for commercial use would affect property along that part of 2300 East
which runs through the downtown Holladay business district.
In Berrata v. Sales, 82 Cal. App. 324, 255 Pac. 538
(1927), omission of street descriptions in a public notice
invalidated a proposed zoning ordinance. Here, similar
defects in description exist which make notice impossible
to even an avid newspaper reader.
Effectiveness of newspaper publication in giving notice
was commented upon by Justice Black in Wll!lker v. City of
Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 116 (1956) :
It is common knowledge that mere newspaper
publication rarely informs a landowner of proceedings against his property.

When the above fact is compounded, as it was in the
present instance, by failing to describe the property in question in such a way that the description is meaningful to
the reader, the notice requirement of the statute is not
complied with. 1
i Tt should be noted that each of the following referred to the
subject property as 23rd East and 45th South; the original application
of the subject property (Def. Ex. 20), the d~ent forwarded. to
Henry S. Florence (Pl. Ex. 1), the staff reproduc;t1on of t~e applica·
ti.on for zoning amendment (Def. Ex. 22), the zorung C?mrmttee !ll~t
ing agenda the staff analysis (Def. Ex. 25), the Planrung CoIIUillssIOn
agenda (D~f. Ex. 26), the minutes of the Plal111;ing Co~ssion (Def.
Ex. '1:7, p. 13), communication between the Zomng Admi~1strator and
the Board of County Commissioners (Def. Ex. 28), the nunutes of the
Board of County Commissioners (Def. Ex. 29), and so forth. See,
Defendants' Exhibits No.'s. 31, 32, 34, 35, 40, 41.
In spite of the common use of this most obvious an~ m?st des·
criptive reference, it was omitted in. the newspaper pu_bhcation ani;
in the piece of paper posted at the Cio/ and County Buildmg anq "'!'
assume it was likewise omitted in the pieces of paper tacked on utility
poles, a copy of which the County could not produce.
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(c) The County Failed to Cause Writings Which Attempted to Give Notice to Be Exposed to the View of the
Public for the Required Period of Time.
The notice contemplated by Section 17-27-17, Utah Code
Annotated, is not a one-shot thing. As heretofore discussed,
there is evidence from which this Court can find that on November 25, 1966, the County caused two pieces of paper to
be attached to utility poles on 2300 East. The County failed,
however, to prove that this notice remained posted for one
day, one week, or the required one month. In fact, the evidence to the contrary is almost conclusive and the trial court
should therefore have found that whatever pieces of paper
were tacked to these poles did not stay on the poles very
long. 1
One of the plaintiffs' witnesses, Audrie Kennington,
had been advised by the Zoning Administrator in the summer of 1966 that she should watch for pieces of paper in the
form of a notice tacked to utility poles near the subject property. (R. 17). Mrs. Kennington testified that she watched
for said notices but was never able to find one. (R. 19-21)
lThe only evidence possibly to the contrary came from Dennis
Leon Ekins a friend of the intervenor-applicant's son. He gave some
heresay te;timony to the effect that ~ ~pant in .his car . had
observed a notice sign. On cross-exammation,_ Mr_. Ek1;?5 . admitted
that the notice and utility pole observed by his fnend nnght have
been on a pole at another intersection . . ." in the Holladay area.
(R. 64)
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Witness Harold Henrichsen, whose property adjoins the
subject property, testified that he resided next to the property in question between Thanksgiving and December 28,
1966 (R. 86); that during this time he worked in his yard,

put up Christmas decorations and removed snow from the
walkway directly in front of one of the utility poles supposedly carrying the posted notice; and that during this
time he saw no such notice, though he did observe a "For
Sale" sign on the subject property and saw persons who
appeared to be surveying the property. (R. 87, 89, 90, 91).
Another witness, Mrs. Agnes Keller, who does not drive
and who walked from her home which is on Russell Street
along the pathway between the two utility poles and the
properties fronting on the east side of 2300 East, fourteen
or fifteen times during the period between Thanksgiving
and December 28, 1966, testified that she observed the utility
poles but saw no notices tacked to them. (R. 76, 77)
Similarly, other area citizens who passed through the
intersection of 2300 East and 4500 South many times each
week, including Sundays, testified that in ascertaining that
approaching traffic eastward along 4500 South was not a
hazard, they looked in the direction of the northernmost
of the two utility poles and that they saw no papers or signs
of the type testified to by Mr. Hardman (R. 100, 110-114,
119, 139, 140)
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The legislature provided that affected parties should
have thirty days worth of posted notice. 1 In determining
what is sufficient compliance with such a statute, the court
said in Callahan Rd. Improvement Co. v. Town of Newburgh, 167 N.Y.S. 2d 780, 783 (Sup. Ct. 1957) aff'd 173
N.Y.S. 2d 780 (2d Dept. 1958):
A slavish and technical adherence to the notice
is not required. On the other hand there cannot be
substantial and extensive deviations from the expressed objectives of the public hearing.
Or, as stated by courts of sister states:
[T]he general law prevails and unless the
[zoning) procedure there specified is substantially
followed the proposed ordinance does not become
effective. It needs no citation of authority to sup1
That more than a single day's notice is required is clear from
the provisions of section 17-27-17, Utah Code Annotated. The first
part of this section involves zoning certain portions of the unincorporated area within the County. When such action is taken, the
following notice, is required:
A notice of the time, the place and purpose of such
hearing and containing a description of the boundaries of
the proposed district shall be given by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation within the County by
one publication at least 30 days prior to the date of
such hearing.
Note: The above notice provision clearly says that the publication
shall be at least 30 days prwr to the date of such hearing. This
should be oontrasted with the notice language with respect t.o changing
a zoning ordinance which appears in the latter portion of this statute:
At least 30 days notice of the time and place of which
shall be given by at least one publication in a newspap~r
of general circulation in the County and by posting m
three public places designed to give notice thereof to the
persons affected.
.
There is a substantial difference in the text between the two notice
provisions found in section 17-27-17. The former says one publication "at least 30 days prwr to the date of the hearing." The second
says "at least 30 days' notice of the time and :place shall be. given."
If the legislature had intended the same meanmg to apply m. ea~h
case, the legislature would have used the same l~gu~ge. A_s it did
not, it is clear that with zoning changes 30 days notice is reqwred and
not one notice 30 days prior to the day of the hearing.
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port the statement that notice of a proposed passage
of a zoning ordinance limiting the use of property
which, otherwise naturally attracts to the property
in question, is a substantial matter and is one of
which property owners are entitled to notice. The
property owners, as has been so frequently said in
other cases, is entitled to have his day in court.
Berrata v. Sales, 82 Cal. App. 324, 255 Pac. 538
(1927).
See also Wood v. Town of Avondale, 72 Ariz. 217, 232
P.2d 963 (1951); People v. Village of Oak Park, 228 Ill. 256,
109 N.E. 11 (1915); Grimmer v. City of Spokane, 64 Wash.
388, 116 Pac. 878 (1911).
Substantial compliance with a statute requiring that
thirty days' notice be given is not complied with through the
simple act of affixing two pieces of paper to two poles and
one piece of paper to a probate notice board. To give notice,
the sign must remain where it is posted for the requisite
number of days or a period of time substantially equivalent
thereto. 1 Compare Walker v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 208
Mo. 72, 116 A.2d 393, 401 (1955). The overwhelming
weight of the evidence demonstrated that neither requirement was met in this instance.
No one on behalf of the County verified that the pieces
of paper fastened to the probate notice board or to the utility
poles remained so fastened for thirty days or for any sub1 In some jurisdictions procedural requirements outline~ i_n zoning
ordinance must be strictly followed. 8 McQuiUan on Municipal Corporatrons, §25.245; Town of Greenburgh v. Bobandal Realties, Jnc.,
203 N.Y.S. 2d 328 (1960).
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stantial part thereof. There is no evidence at all of any
policing of the pieces of paper. 1
The zoning ordinance must be applied according to its
letter and spirit. Monument Garage Corp. v. Leavey, 266
N.Y. 339, 194 N.E. 848, modifying 241 App. Div. 856, 271
N.Y. Supp. 966, affirming 149 Misc. 791, 268 N.Y. Supp.
213 (1933). Both the letter and spirit of Section 17-27-17
require more than the mere tacking up of a piece of paper.
The section requires that the notice remain conspicuous for
the requisite period of time in order that an actual warning
is given to those affected.

III.
IF WHAT WAS DONE IN THIS CASE MEETS
THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT, THEN
THE PROCEDURE AND ACTION TAKEN BY
THE COUNTY PURSUANT THERETO DEPRIVES AFFECTED PROPERTY OWNERS OF
THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF DUE
PROCESS.
Many recent United States Supreme Court cases have
dealt with this problem of notice. The landmark decision,
Mullane v. Centrail Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
( 1950), involved notice by publication to the beneficiaries of
a common trust fund. The Court thoroughly canvassed the
problem of sufficiency of notice under the Due Process
lThe affidavit of the posting of notice signed by witness Hardman
was not only flagrantly false but was executed by him on December
15, 1966. (R. 35) The County Co~ission sl;ould not have acted
until it had proof that thirty days' notice was given p~rsuant to statute. An affidavit signed December 15, 1966, of a postmg asserted to
have occurred on November 26, 1966, could not possibly be proof that
thirty days' notice was given on a hearing to be held December 28, 1966.

26
clause. It found that notice by publication did not give the
persons sought to be bound proper notice which would accord them their constitutional rights. Here the trustee knew
the names and addresses of the beneficiaries and there was
no tenable ground for not giving them personal notice. The
reason the published notice was defective was that it was not
reasonably calculated to give notice, i.e., a means better than
publication was readily available which, if employed, would
have more adequately insured that interested parties were
informed of a matter affecting them.
The upshot of the Mu~lane case is that if the person seeking to give notice has the name and address within his personal reach, there is no constitutional reason for not giving
personal notice to one in danger of being divested of some
legal interest. The best notice possible under the circumstances must be given.

In Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956),
the plaintiff owned land in the city of Hutchinson, Kansas.
Pursuant to statute, defendant city moved to condemn land
by determining that it was needed for public use. Three
appointed commissioners assessed the damages. By statute, ,
the commissioners were required to give notice to land·
owners and lien holders of record, either by giving ten days'
notice in writing or by publishing notice once in the official
city newspaper. Published notice was made and damages
determined. Plaintiff sought to enjoin the city from tres· i
passing upon his property, contending that he had been
denied his constitutional right under the Due Process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Both the trial court and the '
Kansas Supreme Court held that published notice accorded
to the plaintiff all of the notice and opportunities for hear·
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in~ to which he ~as entitled. The state court reasoned that
t~1s ":'as true s1.nce the proceeding was ir. rem., and that

h1storically, pubhshed notice was sufficient. The plaintiff
appealed and was granted review.
Resting on Mullane, the Supreme Court held that procedural due process had not been afforded to this plaintiff
and reversed the prior decision. The rule enunciated by the
Court was:
. . . [l]f feasible, notice must be reasonably
calculated to inform parties of proceedings which
may directly and adversely affect their legally protected interests. 1
In Schroeder v. New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962), the
Court was asked to review a New York notice statute. The
City of New York instituted procedings to acquire the right
to divert a portion of a river some 25 miles upstream from
plaintiff's property. In compliance with notice provisions
of the applicable act, the city published notice in several
New York newspapers and it also posted 22 notices on trees
and poles in the general vicinity of plaintiff's premise. Although the name and address of plaintiff was readily ascertainable from both the deed records and the tax roll, there
was no attempt personally to notify plaintiff. The Court
stated:
We hold that the newspaper publications and
the posted notices in the circumstances of this case
did not measure up to the quality of notice which
the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires.

* * *

As was emphasized in Mullane, the requirement
that parties be notified of proceedings affecting their
lThe essence of Mr. Hard.man's testimony is thB;t the s!gns posted
by him were not of the type that people would readily notice. (R. 3740) (Notice too small to be seen from across the street (R. 37);

Drivers going north on 23rd East would "have to bend up and look
up the window" (R. 38, 39); Drivers ooming along 45th South would
have difficulty seeing the sign due to topography and "because of its
height above the ground" (R. 39); Pedestrians would have to walk
"around the pole" to see the sign (R. 40) ) .
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legally protected interests is obviously a vital corollary to one of the most fundamental requisites of due
proc~ss-the . right to be heard. "This right . . .
has little re3:hty or vy-orth unless one is informed that
the matter is pendmg and can choose for himself
whether to appeal or default, acquiesce or consent."
339 U.S. at 314.

* * *

The general rule that emerges from the Mullane case is that notice by publication is not enough
with respect to a person whose name and address
are known or very easily ascertainable and whose
legally protected interests are directly affected by
the proceedings in question. 1
'In Naisbitt u. Herric_k, 76 l!tah. 575, 2~0 Pac. _950 (1930), the
plaintiff below brought smt to q~et title agamst vanous defendants.
Plaintiff attempted to secure service of smnmons upon appellant by
publication even though appellant had been in actual possession of
the disputed property. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court said:
In proceedings to open default judgments, . . . where
there has been merely constructive service of process ...
[t]he rule of law deductible from the adjudicated cases
... is that: if a moving party shows (1) that he has not
been personally served with process, (2) that he has had
no actual notice of the pendency of the action in time to
appear and make his defense, (3) that he is injuriously
affected by the judgment and (4) that he has tendered
an issue to the merits of the claim of his adversary, then
and in such case he has an absolute right to have the
judgment opened. 290 Pac. at 953.
In defining constructive service of process, the court went on to
say:
If it can be said that the particular manner in which
constructive service is had is well calculated to give notice
to the person served, then there is a presumption, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, that such person had
actual notice. On the other hand, if the manner in which
constructive service of process is had is not calculated
to give actual notice to the person served, then there is
no presumption that such person had actual notice, and
the burden is cast upon the opposing party to show actual
notice. Due process of law requires that before one can
be bound by judgment affecting his property rights, some
process must be served upon him which in some degree at
least is calculated to give him notice. 290 Pac. at 954.
(Emphasis added.)
In finding service defective in this particular case, the court con·
eluded:
If it be true that appellant was in possession ~f the
premises involved in this proceeding at the time smt was
begun and thereafter, respondent may not be heard to
say that appellant was an unknown claimant of the_ pr~m
ises and thereby secure service of process by publicat10n
as was done in this case ... 290 Pac. at 954.
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It is true that in addition to publishing in newsP:1pers, the city in the present case did put some
signs on trees and poles along the banks of the river.
But no such sign was placed anywhere on the appellant's property or ever seen by her. 1 371 U.S. at 211213.

See also City of New York v. New York N.H. & H. Ry.
Co., 344 U.S. 293 (1953).
The applicability of MuUane and its progeny to zoning
matters was the topic of an article appearing in 37 Neb. L.
Rev. 232 (1958). The author noted that Nebraska had a
zoning statute providing for publication of zoning changes,
plus the posting of "notices ... in a conspicuous place on or
near the property ... " 2 The author posed the following question:
Has the Due Process clause of the Constitution
of the United States been met when personal notice
is not given under said section 904 nor given except
as to a certain class under section 905 ?3
His reasoned answer was as follows:
In considering the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States [MuUane, Walker, City
of New York] such decisions indicate that notice
1
In the present proceeding, neither of the piece;; of paper on the
two utility poles was "ever seen" by affected parties. Nor wa_s !he
piece of paper at the west steps of the City and County BUildmg
ever seen by the affected parties.
2The Nebraska statute further prnvided that "it shall be unlawful for anyone to remove, mutilate, destroy or_ change such posted
notice prior to any hearing. Any person so domg shall be ~ty of
a misdemeanor." The Utah statute has no comparable proVJS10n.
3Section 904 of the Nebraska statute pertains to original zo~ing
by a municipality and section 905 pertains to amending, changmg,
modifying or repealing zoning regulations theretofore enacted.
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required under 904 and 905 are not sufficient to
meet the Due Process clause of the Constitution.
[Emphasis added.]
In summary, the essence of Mullane, Walker, City of

New York, and particularly the recent case of Schroeder
is that where a better way of giving notice is readily avail-'
able, use of a lesser method is in deprivation of the rights
guaranteed by the Due Process clause.
In the present instance, the County knew of- or could
readily have ascertained the names and addresses of neighborhood property owners who would be affected by the
change of zoning. A simple form letter would have apprised
such persons of their rights without unduly hampering or
burdening the County. 1 And, from Mullane, it appears that
such a notice need not reach everyone, but only those most
likely to safeguard the interest of all. 2
The failure of section 17-27-17, Utah Code Annotated,
to require notice calculated to insure compliance with the
1 The County's own procedural regulations for processing zoning
applications require the applicant to submit a list of names of prop·
erty owners within 150 feet of the subject property. Such an expanded
list, furnished by applicant at its expense, could readily provide the
basis for a mailing. By way of analogy to a judicial suit, an applicant
for a zoning change could be required to serve, under affidavit,_no~ce
to adjacent property owners. The County processed the application
even though applicant failed to supply these names and addresses.

ZThe over-all unfairness of the defendants' notice procedure is
further compounded by the fact that a personal lett~r was _sent w
Mr. Roderick, the applicant! advising him ?f t,~e public he~nng 3:11d
requesting him or his authonzed representative _to attend t~s heai;mg
to present any information which may be pertment to this app~ca·
tion." (Def. Ex. D-32) No similar notice was sent t~ th~ <?ther s1d_e,
i.e., affected homeowners. Such action is patently d!scnmmatory in
violation of Article I, section 1 of the Utah Constitution.
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XIVth Amendment to the Federal Constitution renders action of the County based on the "Notice" part of that statute
unconstitutional. Likewise, the statute is in juxtaposition
to the due process guaranty of Article 1, section 7 of the
Constitution of Utah. 1
IV.
DEFENDANTS FAILED TO OBSERVE STATUTORY AND PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
OTHER THAN REQUIREMENTS FOR NOTICE
AND SUCH FAILURE INVALIDATES THE
ATTEMPTED CHANGE OF ZONING.
The instant change of zoning commenced when Bill
Roderick, on behalf of Bill Roderick, Inc., delivered to Ralph
Y. McClure, Salt Lake County Zoning Administrator, a $20
filing fee and an application for zoning amendment. (Def.
Ex. D-20). He did not comply with the remainder of the procedure of the zoning office (as set forth in Def. Ex. D-19)i.e., he did not submit names of property owners within 150
feet of the subject parcels; he did not supply a signed statement from property owners whose property was a subject
of zoning change indicating their attitude concerning the
rezoning, and he was not a proper applicant. Each of these
things is required by the County's own zoning procedure
(Def. Ex. D-19)
Of the three noncompliances the most fatal is that Bill
Roderick was not a proper applU:ant. The County's zoning
:('i{i

INaisbitt v. Herrick, supra, note 1 at p. 28.
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procedure requires that applications for zoning amendments
be filed by the owner of the property involved or by his authorized agent.1 (Def. Ex. D-19 p. 3)
At the time Bill Roderick filed the application for a
zoning amendment he was not the owner of the subject
property and was likwise not authorized by the owners of
the property to make the application on their behalf. (R. 1920) 2
On or about November 4, 1966, the Zoning Administrator caused to be mailed to Henry S. Florence of the Holladay
District Planning Commission a letter requesting action by
that body. (Def. Ex. D-24.) Contemporaneously and before
receiving any response from any member of the Holladay
District Planning Commission, the staff of the Zoning Administrator met and considered the application (Def. Ex.
D-25.)
IThe wisdom of this requirement is obvious. Without it conceiv·
ably the owner of a commercial site could awaken one morning to
find that someone else had caused his property to be rezoned residential or vice versa.
2 The subject property consists of two parcels, one of which was
owned by Pearl B. Henrichsen, the other by Milton P. Matth~ws.
(Def. Ex. D-3) Bill Roderick had no authority from Pearl Hennch·
sen and only oral authorization from Matthews. The latt!'.r, howe~er,
is not legally sufficient to permit Bill Roderick to apply smce sectwn
57-1-8 Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended, requires a written
power of attorney or other written' instrument granting power to !1il
agent in instances where real estate is to be conveyed or otherwise
affected.
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On or about November 18, 1966 - again before receipt
of any response from any member of the Holladay District
Planning Commission - the zoning subcommittee and the
Salt Lake County Planning Commission met and considered
the application.
On November 21, 1966 (being subsequent to action by the
staff, the zoning subcommittee and the planning commission) the zoning office received a response from a single
member of the Holladay District Planning Commission. (Pl.

Ex. P-1)

The written procedure of the zoning office for processing applications for change of zoning requires that an application be submitted first to the District Planning Commission which is allowed 30 days in which to act before the application is considered by the Planning Commission. No
explanation was given about why this application was given
preferential treatment.1
A municipal legislative body must substantially follow
the internal regulations it has itself established relative to
1
The procedure of the County on change o~ zoning applications
calls for a minimum of three months for processmg. (Def. Ex. D-19)
First the application is submitted to the District Planning Commission
which has thirty days in which to respond. Therea~ter the County
Planning Commission has thirty days in which to consider the m~tJ:er.
Following that, an additional thirty days is ni;c~ry fo~ J?roviding
notice of the hearing before the County CommISS~on. '!hIB is not to
say that in every case ninety days must be tak~n m which to pr~s
an application. But it is obvious that there is greater opportunity
for persons affected to learn about a hea~g ~ be hel.d before !Jie
County Commission if the usual length o~ tm;ie lS taken m processing
the application. Unlike interested parties m most cases, prope~
owners affected by this proceding had far less <;hance of lea~ng
of the hearing because of the hasty and preferential treatment given
this particular application.
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zoning. County Comm'rs. of Arundel County v. Ward, 186
Md. 330, 46 A.2d 684 (1946). It cannot deviate from exist.
ing regulations or make exceptions therefrom on behalf of
individuals. 8 McQuillan on Municipal Corporations, §
25.253.
The opening sentences of section 17-27-17, Utah Code
Annotated, provide:
But any such amendment shall not be made or
become effective unless same shall have been proposed by or first submitted for the approval, disapproval, or suggestions of the district planning commission and shall have approval by the county planning commission. If any such amendment be disapproved by either the county or the district planning commission within thirty days after such submission, to become effective, it shall receive the
favorable vote of not less than a majority of the entire membership of the board of county commissioners.

It is clearly the intent of the statute that the Board
of County Commissioners should have the benefit of the
thinking and recommendation of the District Planning Commission prior to its own action. This consideration is lacking
in the present case.
Testimony of Mr. Hall, a member of the District Planning Commission, demonstrates that he acted alone; that
there was never a meeting of the District Planning Commis·
sion on this matter and that residents in the area contacted
by him uanimously opposed a change of zoning. (R. 3-10)
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From the evidence, the trial court should have held that
the Holladay District Planning Commission did not act as
a commission. Consequently, the County Commission was
denied the chance of considering the thinking and feeling of
the District Planning Commission and those citizens whose
recommendations it should property reflect. 1
This deviation from the statute is of no small moment.
As stated in Armourdale State Bank v. Kansas City, 131
Kan. 419, 421, 422, 292 Pac. 745, 746 (1930):
A preliminary consideration of a proposed
change in a zoning ordinance by a competent body of
disinterested persons is not a mere formality but an
essential and important prerequisite to official action affecting the value and use of the private property. The power to ordain city zoning ordinances,
and to amend, supplement, or change them, is not a
mere perquisite attaching to the office of the mayor
and councilmen or city commissioners, to be granted
or withheld at their grace or caprice. The legislature devised what it considered an effective barrier
against such a possibility when it provided that
zoning matters should first be considered by an
impartial body of resident taxpayers chosen for that
purpose. 2
See also, Ford v. City of Hutchinson, 140 Kan. 309,
37 P.2d 39 (1934).
1 Defendants' exhibits D-34, p. 9 and D-35~ p. 2 dem<;>~trate that
the specious document of the District ~l~rng . Co~10n was .a
factor considered by the County CoIIlilllss1oners m arnvmg at their
decision.
2The impartiality of Mr. Hall'~ reco!11filendatii;in is questionable
due to the impropriety of the applicant. m contactin&" ~r. Hall 8;Jld
urging him to return the recommendation of the District Planning
Commission to the Zoning Administrator post haste. (R. 5)
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v.
DEFENDANT COMMISSIONERS' ACTIONS
WERE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.
At the County Commission level all parties to a zoning
matter stand at parity. That is, each need only prove or
disprove the merits of the application for a change of zoning. A different situation exists, however, on appeal for
judicial review. At this level a court will not substitute its
judgment for that of the commission even though the court
itself might have come to a different conclusion. Naylor v.
Salt Lake City Corporation, 17 Utah 2d 300, 410 P.2d 764
(1966). Consequently on judicial review the only chance of
upsetting a zoning decision other than by showing a deprivation of rights without due process of law is by being able to
demonstrate that the County Commission acted arbitrarily
and capricously. Gayland v. SaU Lake County, 11 Utah 2d
307, 358 P.2d 633 (1961).
The rule heretofore stated has merit in cases such as
Gayland and Naylor where the party opposing the zoning
had a chance to make a record before the County Comrnis·
sion. However, in the present case this rule should not be
strictly applied as appellants have been denied in the first
instance a chance to present evidence before the County
Commission. 1
Notwithstanding that the Court should not apply harshly to appellant this "arbitrary and capricious" rule, this
Court may - from the record which was established 1 In addition because plaintiffs' complaint was dismi~ed th~ po~·
0
ture of the case on appeal is that the evidence must be viewed Ill \ 0
light most favorable to appellants. Clark v. City of Boulder, 146 Co ·
526, 362 P.2d 160 (1961).

I
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interfere with the decision of the Commission since "there
is no reasonable basis whatsoever to justify it and its actions must therefore be regarded as capricious and arbitrary." Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 410 P.2d at
766.
Further in reviewing the decision below this Court
should bear in mind that:
Findings and conclusions of a trial court as to
the reasonableness [constitutionality] of zoning ordinance are not binding on appellate courts if the
record shows that that question is debatable and the
appellant court may consider in some detail the basic
physical facts appearing on the record, such as character of the property of the objecting parties, nature
of the surrounding territory, use to which each has
been put, recent trends of development, etc. Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal. 2d 453, 202 P.2d
38 (1949) 1
(a) In refusing to permit property owners affected
by the attempted change of zoning from having an opportunity to be heard, the defendant Commissioners acted arbitrarily and capriciously.
Immediately upon first learning that the County Commission had held a hearing upon the subject property, interested homeowners in the area signed a petition for reconsideration. (Pl. Ex. P-48) Significantly, over 200 home'In rezoning matters the presumption o~ reasonableness o_f. the
zoning amendment does not have the same we1g~t. as does th~ onginal
zoni•g; hence the courts are more free_ to scrutimze ,the ments of the
rezoning. Northwest Merchants Terminal, Inc. v. 0 Rourke, 191 Md.
171, 60 Atl. 2d 743, 752 (1948). The reason for this difference is obvious
An amended zoning ordinance does not have the same th~JUght ~nd
study behind it as exists behind a master or comprehensive zorung

Plan.
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owners signed the petition. 1 The petition was addressed
to the Salt Lake County Commission and on January 10,
1967, was personally delivered to Commissioners Hanson
and Blomquist (R. 128). Notwithstanding the petition, the
following morning, January 11, 1967, Commissioner Blomquist signed an Ordinance, reclassifying the subject property.
The County Commission's intemperate act of refusing
to hear or even consider the evidence proposed to be offered
by citizens who had no prior opportunity to be heard and
who would be most immediately affected by its decision
amounts to a clear abuse of the Commission's power and an
infringement upon citizen rights.
In outlining procedures and considerations required of
Salt Lake County in administering its zoning powers, this
Court has stated:
1Among those who petitioned the County Commission in a desperate attempt to be heard were adjoining property owners:
(i) the property owner abutting to the south (H. R. Hen·
richsen, also known as Harold R. Hendrichsen 4555 South 2300
East, exhibits D-48 (7th sheet) and D-3);
(ii) the property owners adjoining the east side of Russell
Street which adjoins the subject property to the east, (Emerson
H. Kennington and Audrie M. Kennington, 4507 Russell Street,
Agnes Helen Keller, 4503 Russell Street, and Hazel W. Fisher,
4505 Russell Street, exhibits D-48 (7th sheet) and D-3);
(iii) a property owner adjoining the north side of 4500 Sou~h
Street which adjoins the subject property to the north, (Darwt!J
Dowsett, 2361 East 4500 South, exhibits D-48 (9th sheet) an
D-46);
(iv) the property owner at the northwest corner of the
intersection of 2300 East _and 4500 South, kitty-corner. f~om ~~
subject property (Ellen Pihl, 4482 South 2300 East, exhibits D
(12th sheet) and D-47), and
(v) thirty-five owners of dwellings in Carriage Lane
dominium, directly southwest across 2300 East from the su l
property (exhibits D-48 (5th and 6th sheets) and D-47) ..
Thus, owners of property adjoining all sides of the subJect prop·
erty sought to be heard.

f°eci

.

'

. . It [the ?~unt~ Commission] has the responsib1hty of adv1smg itself of all pertinent facts as a
basis for determining what is in the public interest
in that regard. For this reason, it is entirely approriate to hold public hearings and to allow any interested party it desires to give information and to present their ideas on the matter . . . In performing
their duties, it is both their privilege and ·obligation
to take into consideration their own knowledge of
such matters and also to gather available pertinent
information from all possib1le sources and give co~
sideration to it in making their determination. Gayland v. Salt Lake County, 11 Utah 2d 307, 358 P.2d
633, 636 (1961) [Emphasis added]
The consequence attendant to failure to observe these
requirements was also spelled out by the Court:
[T] he court can impede decisions of legislative
bodies where the actions of the latter are "unconstitutional" for some such reason as it deprives one of
property without due process of law, or capriciously
and arbitrarily infringes upon his rights therein
or is unjustly discriminatory. 358 P.2d at 636.
In this case, a highly responsive "source" - affected
citizens - tried desperately to supply to the County Commissioners considerable information and facts pertaining
to the subject matter. This offer was summarily rejected.
As noted from the Gayland decision, there is nothing
requiring or limiting the Commission from considering information brought to its attention subsequent to the date
of a public hearing; and, in fact, it would seem that such
action is required for as long a time as the ordinance is under advisement.

40

That the ordinance was still under .advisement at the
time the citizens' petition was tendered to the Commissioners
is clear from the contents of a letter sent by the Commissioners following their December 28, 1966, meeting to the
Zoning Administrator requesting the latter "to prepare an
ordinance on same [the subject property] which will be presented at a later date for the Board's final approval." (Def.
Ex. D-37)
It is well settled that a municipal legislative body may

reconsider its action and rescind an ordinance that has been
previously enacted or enact an ordinance that has previously
been defeated, and it may act thusly at any time before
the rights of third parties have become vested. 1 In other
words, the municipal legislative body has a right to reconsider under properly adopted parliamentary procedure its
votes upon questions properly pending before it, and such
body may rescind action previously taken. 2
On January 10, 1967, no one had a vested interest in
the zoning ordinance covering the subject property, and the
Commission, if it had properly discharged its duties as outlined in the Gayland case, could have withheld signing the
ordinance until proper consideration was given to the position of the abutting property owners and other citizens requesting the right to be heard.
The Commission's action "capriciously and arbitrarily
infringe [ d] upon the rights ... " of those citizens who peti'MacMahon v. Davis 284 Ill. 439, 120 N.E. 326 (1918); Tuell v.
Meacham, Contracting Co., 145 Ky. 181, 140 S.W. 159 (1911); Mc·
Corwughey v. Jackson, 101 Cal. 265, 35 Pac. 863 (1894).
2/d.

'
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tioned for reconsideration of the zoning change and who
had not had their "day in court." 1 Gayland, supra, at 636.
(b) Both the method by which the subject property
was rezoned and the result of the rezoning are unreasonable
and unconstitutional.
Section 17-27-4 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended
is a directive to the County to "make and adopt a master
plan for the physical development" of the County. The
purpose of the plan is to accomplish "a coordinated, adjusted and harmonious development of the county which
will, in accordance with present and future needs and resources best promote the general welfare of the inhabitants
. . ." of the county. Section 17-27-5 Utah Code Annotated.
Pursuant to legislation, Salt Lake County in 1965 adoptr
ed a Master Zoning Plan. (Def. Exs. D-42, D-43) A review
of the Master Plan of Salt Lake County and the Master
Plan map clearly shows that the area in which the subject
property is located was earmarked for residential development only (Def's. Ex. D-42, p. 43) 2
1
A parallel to the action of the County Commission is the abuse
of discretion of a trial judge in not setting aside a default judgment
of a party who makes a timely request in cases where there is reasonable justification for setting aside the default. Mayhew v. Standard
Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P.2d 951 (1962).
'Defendants and intervenor stipulated to plaintiffs proffer of
evidence that the area surrounding 2300 East and 4500 South consists of expensive homes. (R. 161-2). See also plaintiffs' exhib~ts
P-15 16 17 and defendants' exhibit D-34, p. 9. (Testimony of a witness 'for' applicant, Mary _Metcalf, at the C~unty_ Commissio~, level
said that this "is a very highly developed residential area . . . )
In its petition for reconsideration directed to the County Commissioners and in its complaint below, appellants sought to prove 1J?.at
the decision of the County Commission was erroneous.. In each rnstance appellant has had to make the best record J!<>SSible over the
refusal of the Commission and court to hear such eVIdence. (R. 184)
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Further, scrutiny of the Master Zoning Plan shows no
provisions for commercial zoning of the type in question
here. With reference to commercial zoning the Master
Zoning Plan refers to three types: i.e., a central business district, regional shopping centers, and community and neighborhood shopping centers. At no point does the plan recommend, suggest or propose permitting spot zoning. 1 Central
business districts are intended to serve the over-all needs of
communities. Regional shopping centers such as the Cottonwood Mall are designed to serve each planning district.
Community and neighborhood shopping centers on the other
hand are "proposed to be conveniently located to serve local
shopping needs throughout the valley." (Def. Ex. D-42, p. 3)
(Salt Lake County Master Zoning Plan)
The smallest recognized and permissible commercial development is the community and neighborhood shopping
centers. To conform with the Master Plan these community
and neighborhood shopping centers must be designed and
located in an area appropriate to provide for the convenient
needs of people living in their immediate vicinity. Further,
these small centers must "range from three to ten acres in
'The goals and policies which guided the prepa~B;tion, of the
Master Plan were formulated by the Salt Lake Valley Citizens Coon·
cil. (Def. Ex. D-42, p. 22.) This particular council was extremely
concerned about strip zoning which is simply. 8;Il o~tgrowt~ af s~~
zoning. In this regard the Salt Lake Valley Citizens Council stat ·
An excessive amount of strip or thoroughfare comm~~cial
development which results in traffic congestion, lack of SJ.!ffiCid~
parking, rapid turnover of tenants and_ consequent. phys1car ~
terioration of buildings because of unsatisfactory busme~ vo fu~
These strip developments, for the mos~ P3:rt, b~gan P!1°r toned
adoption of zoning. Such development is s~ill. gomg on m .unzoned
areas such as Hunter-Granger and to a limited exten.t in zo. g
areas through the granting of additional commercial Mm~~
(Planning Goals and Policies for the Salt Lake County as
Plan, p. 11) [Emphasis added]
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size." (Def. Ex. D-42 p. 31.) 1 That the subject property
fails to meet these standards is clear. The property is only
slightly over one acre - considerably below the size requirements necessary to develop a neighborhood center. (Def.
Ex. D-20) Neighborhood shopping centers for the area surrounding the subject property have already been provided
for. Commercially zoned property of the neighborhood
shopping size, or greater, within a short distance of the subject property includes the downtown Holladay shopping
area, the Cottonwood Mall, much of both sides of 33rd South
between Highland Drive and Wasatch Blvd., large shopping
centers at 39th South and Wasatch Blvd., at 45th South
and Wasatch Blvd., and neighborhood shopping centers at
39th South and 2300 East and 27th East and 40th South.
(Def. Exs. D-44, Zoning Map Section A and Zoning Map
Section B, and Def. Ex. D-33.)
The very use of the terms "zoning" has come to mean
land use regulation pursuant to a "comprehensive zoning
ordinance." Metzenbaum, Law of Zoning, p. 19 (2nd ed.,
1955). Utah courts are clearly concerned with the orderly
development of communities:
The basic purpose of zoning is to "bring about an
orderly development of cities, to establish districts
into which business, commerce and industry shall
not intrude, and to fix certain territory for different grades of industrial concerns. * * * The exercise
[of this power] must have a substantial relation to
1 With reference to the size of comrounity and neighborhood sh<;>I?ping centers it was the recomroendation of the Salt Lake Valley Citizens Council that the centers have five to ten acres as ~ av~
number of acres to be developed. See, final report of Plannmg
and Policies for Salt Lake County Master Plan, p. 18.
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the public good within the spheres held proper. White
Appeal, 287 Pac. 259, 134 Atl. 409, 412, 53 A.L.R.
1215. It is a fundamental theory of the zoning
scheme that it shall be for the general good, to secure
reasonable neighborhood uniformity, and to exclude
structures and occupations which clash therewith.
Marshall v. Salt Lake County, 105 Utah 111, 141 P.2d
704, 709 (1943).
The only way of keeping the Master Zoning Plan viable
is by requiring that amendments to it conform to and be in
accordance with it. Freeman v. Yonkers, 205 Misc. 947,
129 N.Y.S. 2d 703 (1954). 1 Consequenly where the amendatory action is not in accordance with the comprehensive plan,
is in no way calculated to achieve the statutory objectives and
results in unwarranted discrimination in favor of the owner
of the lot in question, the reclassification is invalid. Cassi·
nari v. Union City, 1 N.J. Supp. 219, 63 A.2d 891 (1949);
Appley v. Township Committee, 128 N.J.L. 195, 24 A.2d
805 (1942). See also Marshall v. Salt Lake City, supra.
In order to achieve the purpose of the Master Zoning
Plan uniformity is required. For example, section 17-27-11
Utah Code Annotated provides that:
All such regulations shall be uniform for each class
or kind of building or structure throughout any zone.
The intent of language such as this was set forth in
DeBlasiis v. Bartell, 143 Pa. Super. 485, 18 A.2d 478 (1941):
In this regard the Master Zoning Plan states:
be
Revision of Salt Lake County Zoning ordinance should ed
· · t•ion b Y concern
carried out as a special program by part1c1pa_
ublic.
governmental agencies as well as representatives of the P
Def. Ex. D-42, p. 57. [Emphasis added]
1

4b

The enabling statute on which the zoning ordinance
must rest declares that regulations under the ordinance must be uniform for each class or kind of
buildings, structures or land throughout each district. And this is in harmony with the general rule
that the ordinance adopted under a zoning law must
not be unreasonably discriminatory. While the City
Council has broad powers in this respect, it has no
right or authority to place restrictions on one person's property and arbitrarily and by mere favor
remove such restrictions from another's property
there being no reasonable grounds or basis for their
discrimination.
The important language quoted which is fundamental
in zoning is that all property similarly situated is to be
classified alike. Arbitrary discrimination is improper and
unconstitutional. Amendatory action must be grounded in
reason and judgment based upon the policy of the statute.
Appley v. Township Committee, supra.
( c) It is clear that the decision rezoning the southeast
corner of 2300 East and 4500 South is not grounded upon
reason or based upon the policy of the statute.
Amendments to zoning plans are permissible only if
(i) they conform to the master or comprehensive zoning
plan or (ii) they benefit the general public. 149 A.L.R.
292; 51 A.L.R. 2d 63. A possible third ground used in instances where the amendment appears contrary to a comprehensive plan is where either the plan is outdated or the
neighborhood has deteriorated to the extent that the plan
is no longer applicable to it. Crone v. Town of Brighton,
119 N.Y.S. 2d 877 (1952).
Taking the above points in reverse order, there was
no evidence before the County Commission at its December
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28,. 1966 meeting or before the trial court in this action
which indicates that there has been any deterioration in
the high quality residential nature of the area.1 All of the
evidence that is in the record is to the contrary.2

Similarly there is not one scintilla of evidence in the
record before the County Commission or the court indicating a public need or demonstrating a benefit to the public
1
• •
T_h.e present case is easily distinguishable from this Court's dec1s1on m Naylor u. Salt Lake City Corporation, 17 Utah 2d 300, 410
P. ?c! 764 (1966). In Naylor there was a record which supported the
dec1s1on rendered:

From the record viewed in the light most favorable thereto
theri: are a number of considerations which can be regarded as
tending to support the rezoning ordinance and the trial court's
judgment sustained as valid. Among these are: that there has
been a gradual extension of the business and commercial usage
of the property outward from the center of the city in the direc·
tion of this area; that there is some congestion and deterioration
of residence, the removal of which may tend to alleviate health
hazards and an increasing crime rate, particularly among juven·
iles in that locality; that the Commission has in other similar
situations used the classification of "Business B-3" as buffer
zones between residential and commercial and business areas.
410 P. 2d at 766.
No such reasons exist in the present case.
2Mary Metcalf, one of the witnesses supporting intervenor (then
the applicant for change of zoning) at the so-called hearing befor:e ~e
County Commission on December 28, 1966, recognized the existing
residential character of the area. Def. Ex. D-34, p. 9. The text ~(
her comment is: "It is a very highly developed residential area .. · ·
Pl. Ex. P-1, P-17 and P-18 which are photographs of the area mtroduced to reflect the absence on any utility pole of any piece of paper
or other notice of the hearing to be held December 28, 1966, shrs
its existing high class residential character. See also the Master
(Def. Ex. D-42) and the Master Plan map (Def. Ex. D-43) whic
reflect the same. Because of the ruling of the trial judge not to rt;t
ceive evidence "on the merits" plaintiffs were not permitted to subJllJ
evidence such as p~otographs o_f dw~llings in the area as a whole ~
reflect its general high-class residential ~haracter. On the oth~r h~al
there is no evidence from defendants or mtervenor that the res1den d
character of the neighborhood has deteriorated. Furthe~ore. ;d
fendants and intervenor stipulated that the area surroundmg 23
East and 45th South consists of expensive homes. R. 161-2.

P.h
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generally to come from zoning the subject property commercial.1 And in fact the evidence clearly demonstrates the
opposite.
For the public generally to benefit from an amended
zoning ordinance, that ordinance must promote the "health,
safety, morals, convenience, order, prosperity and welfare
of the present and future inhabitants of Salt Lake County
... " Section 8-1-2 Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County,
1953. That the commercial zoning of the subject property
would run contrary to the intent of the above quoted section
was the unanimous recommendation of the Salt Lake County
zoning staff and the Salt Lake County Planning Commission:
Twenty-three Hundred East is a major artery and
future widening is proposed. Traffic on the street
at present is very heavy and the Staff feels that
granting this zoning change would only contribute
to the congestion ... its nearness to other commercial zones raises the question as to whether additional
commercial sites are necessary. (Def. Ex. D-25) 2
The Zoning Staff, the Zoning Committee and the Planning Commission unanimously voted to deny the zoning
1 In Marshall v. Salt Lake City 105 Utah 111, 141 P. 2d 704 (1943),
the Court upheld a comprehensive zoning ordinai:ice as it ~ontribu~ed
to the general welfare. Basically the general zorung plan m questi?n
provided that within reasonable walking distance of all homes, dally
family convt>niences and necessities must be available. The Court
merely found that the ordinance in question accomplished f:his res~t;
was consequently in harmony with the City's comprehensive zorung
plan and did not violate the following principle:
But the principle is fund~~nt~l t?at the city ~ zoning, must
do so by districts and not by indiscriminate spot zorung. 141 P. 2d
at 709. [Emphasis by the Court]
.
'The Master Zoning Plan provides that _two o! t~e fu?1re ma1or
arterial roads in the Big Cottonwood Planrung D1stnct will be 23rd
East and 45th South. (Def. Ex. D-42, p. 42).

application. (Def. Ex. D-25) Despite this and in the ab.
sence of any evidence to the contrary the Salt Lake County
Commission overruled its o-wn zoning staff and Planning
Commission and approved the application. Such action is
patently arbitrary and caprcious. Gayland, supra.
The only other ground for amending a master plan viz.,
-that the amendment conforms to the intent of the master
plan - is not satisfied in this case. The Salt Lake County
Master Zoning Plan clearly provides that the area in question is intended to be used for residential development. (Def.
Ex. D-42, D-43.) Nor can the rezoning be justified as a
permitted change in the Master Plan, such as for a neighborhood shopping center because the subject property is not
large enough and because no need has been shown. 1
Where the above grounds cannot be readily shown, the
rezoning is not favored because in too many instances the
1 The whole intersection or a major part of property surrounding
it must be changed to commercial if it is to be justified as a permitt.ed
deviation from the Master Plan. Owners of property abutting the
subject property are the ones who are hurt. The rezoning did not
change their property to commercial. They cannot reap any of the
financial benefits of commercial zoning, but are damaged by its detn·
ment.s. Herein lies the grossly unfair discrimination by this act
of the Commission. The abutting property owners have not been
treated uniformly. There is no evidence of record to justify ~Y
specially favored treatment of the subject property for commerc1al
use which is not equally applicable to the abutting property. If an
area large enough for a neighborhood shopping center (from 3 to 10
acres) had been zoned commercial at this location the '.lction. of the
Commission conceivably might be justified as in keepmg with 7e
purposes of the Master Plan. But there is no justification at all : ~
permitting this tiny spot of commercial property, unconnected witu;
and blocks away from any other commercially zoned property, .
intrude into a residential area. Otherwise, a tiny spot of commerCJ~
use could be created at every intersection in the County and thereb)
prevent any planned development, resulting in all of the I?rob~ernJ
of no zoning at all, the removal of which is the only co!IBtitutJO_n t
justification for inference with property rights by zorung, m the fus
instance.
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rezoning is only an aid to some private owner or parcel
rather than being for the general welfare of the entire
community. Metzenbaum, supra, p. 1517(b). As stated in
the syllabus to Ellicott v. Mayor of Baltimore, 180 Md. 176,
23 A.2d 649 (1942):
An exception of a single lot from operation of city
ordinance zoning area in which it is located as residential district, in order to permit erection of a filling station hereof is illegal, though attempted by
municipal ordinance, unless made because of exceptional conditions under authority of enabling act and
there can be no valid exception thereof merely as a
favor to a lot owner because it is more profitable to
him if used for such purpose. 1
On January 10, 1967, 204 citizens in the affected area
presented to Defendant Commissioner Blomquist a written
petition requesting that the County Commission reconsider
its action and permit them to be heard. The very next day
Commissioner Blomquist in the absence of Chairman Hanson signed the ordinance amending the zoning classification of the subject property. This was done in spite of the
petition before the Commission.
The trial judge would not permit plaintiffs to examine
Bill Roderick, president of Bill Roderick, Inc., as to any
possible relationship between Commissioner Blomquist and
Mr. Roderick. However, prior to having this line of questioning completely cut off, plaintiff did establish that Com1 0r as stated in Harrington v. Board of Alamo Heights, 124 S.W.
2d 401, 407 (Tex., 1939):
. .
b
·
The Board may not destroy the general ~estncbon Y p1ec~
meal exemption of pieces of land. equ~ly subJect to t!ie h~d_ship
created in the restriction, or arbitrarily grant a special pnVIlege
denied to others.
See also, Sundlund v. Zoning Board of Pawtucket, 50 RI. 108, 145 Atl.
451 (1929).
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missioner Blomquist is a good friend, "business-wise" of Bill
Roderick, president of Bill Roderick, Inc. (Testimony of
Roderick, R. 15)
The plaintiff was prevented from developing a com.
plete record on this point. Nonetheless, and in view of even
the sketchy information developed, there is sufficient reason
to conclude that Commissioner Blomquist should have abstained from acting on this matter. 1
The evils arising from facts such as exist in the present
record were clearly spelled out in Cassel v. Mayor and City
Counc~l of Baltimore, 195 Md. 348, 73 A.2d 486 (1950):
"Spot zoning" the arbitrary and unreasonable devotion of a small area within a zoning district to use
which is inconsistent with the use to which the rest
of the district is restricted, has appeared in many
cities in America as a result of pressure put upon
councilmen to pass amendments to zoning ordinances solely for the benefit of private interest. While
the City Council has wide discretion in enacting
zoning ordinances, it has no authority to place restrictions on one person's property and by mere
favor remove such restrictions from another's prop·
erty, unless there is reasonable ground for the dis·
1By way of analogy, section 17-27~15 Utah Code Annota~ 1953,
as amended with respect to membership on the Board of AdJustment,
states:
The Board of County Commissioners may appoint associate
members of such board, and in the event that any regular membetyr
be temporarily unable to act owing to absence from the counJili
illness, interest in a case before the Board, or _any_ <?ther cause,
place may be taken during such temporary disabiht)'. by an associate member designated for the purpose. [Emphasis added~ ,
Here is an express directive that an interested pu_blic ~ff~ct
should temporarily absent himself from a zoning matter m whicf th:
has an interest. The same rule should equally app~)'. to a member. 0 in
County Commission, . i.e., he shoul?- be disqualified from act!Jl~ote
zoning matters in which he has an mterest - no matter how re

51
increase in "spot "zoning"
m course of time would subvert the original soundness of t~e. comprehensive plan and tend to produce conditions almost as chaotic as existed before
zoning. It is universally held that a "spot zoning
ordinance" which singles out a parcel of land within
the limits of a use district and marks it off into a
separate district for the benefit of the owner
thereby permitting a use of that parcel inconsistent
with the use permitted in the rest of the district
is invalid if it is not in accordance with the compr~
hensive zoning plan and is merely for private gain.

~rimination. ~oreover,

The end result of the zoning change attempted by Salt
Lake County is an arbitrary and capricious act. Supporting
this conclusion is Clark v. City of Boulder, 146 Colo. 526,
362 P.2d 160 (1961), a decision which cannot be distinguished from the instant case. In Clark, the City of Boulder
attempted to change to commercial zoning three lots within
a residential area for the erection of a filling station. The
action was taken contrary to the recommendations of the
City Planning Board. Further the area in which the property in question was located was zoned residential under a
comprehensive plan and ordinance adopted in 1954. Though
the three lots involved were within a residential area, the
comprehensive plan established an area to the east of the
tract in dispute as a shopping center with various retail
outlets, including a filling station. Intervenors, petroleum
products distributors and operators of filling stations, had
purchased the lots in question. The trial court held for the
intervenors dimissed the complaint and owners of the
' the area appealed. The Colorado Supreme
dwellings in
Court reversed with directions to enter judgment in favor
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of appellants. Citing authorities, the court stated:
The principles of these cases are applicable he
I dt
..
h
re.
n e e~mmmg w ether spot zoning is involved,
the test is whether the change in question was mad
wit? the purpose of furthering the comprehensiv:
z?nmg plan or designed merely to relieve the par.
ticular property from restrictions of the zoning
regulations. . . .
Under the facts of this case it cannot be said that
re-zoning part of a planned residential area to permit a filling station is other than an arbitrary act
and a proper exercise of the police power. It clear·
ly fails to take into account the need for reasonable
stablity in zoning regulations ... That the property
may not be used as profitably for residential pur·
poses as for commercial use, furnishes no justifica·
tion for special treatment thereof . . .
One of the difficulties with intervenors' position
is that it fails to recognize that unless a zoning line
is drawn somewhere there can be no zoning at all.
Property owners have the right to rely on existing
zoning regulations when there has been no material
change in the character of the neighborhood which
may require re-zoning in the public interest .. ·
In addition, the development and growth of a com·
prehensively zoned area in accordance with the uses
permitted under the plan, does not permit emascula·
tion of such plan under the guise of "changed con·
ditions" as defendants here contend. . . .
We conclude that the ordinance under review does
not promote any of of the statutory purposes under
which zoning ordinances are enacted, and violates
the previously adopted comprehensive plan. On the
basis of this record it cannot be upheld. 362 P.2d at
162-163.
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The decision in the Clark case is good law and supported overwhelmingly by the decisions of other juisdictions and is not only applicable and controlling, but indistinguishable from the instant case.
(d) When looked at cumulatively the acts and omissions of Salt Lake County are flagrantly discriminatory,
arbitrary and unconstitutional.
A number of acts and omissions of defendant County
Commission demonstrates the arbitrariness of their decision. We list a few:
1. In summarily overruling the decision of the
Zoning Staff, Zoning Committee and the Planning Commission without reason therefor, the County Commission wrecked havoc with the statutory framework
which created the Planning Commission and provides
for a Master Plan. Simply stated, the statute creating
a Planning Commission and a Master Plan must have
some meaning. If the County Commission need pay no
heed to the findings and work of the Planning Commission and may, notwithstanding the Planning Commission's decision and the absence of any economic
evidence to the contrary, change a comprehensive zoning plan, then the statutory framework creating the
Planning Commission and the Master Plan is meaningless and the function of the Planning Commission and
the Master Plan is meaningless.

2. On January 10, the County Commission was
presented with a petition of 204 owners of dwellings
in the area asking for reconsideration of the rezoning
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and for an opportunity to be heard. The following
morning, January 11, the ordinance officially adopt.
ing the change was signed by Commissioner Blomquist
although all pertinent evidence had not been received.
In Linden Methodist Episcopal Church v. Linden, 113
N.J.L. 188, 173 Atl. 593 (1934) the court held a rezoning invalid where it was passed by the common
council with unseeming haste and without having taken
testimony. Cf., Gayland v. Salt Lake County, supra.
3. Commissioner Blomquist as a friend - "busi·
nesswise" - of Bill Roderick, president of Bill Roder·
ick, Inc. should have abstained from participating in
the decision on this matter. See Linden Met}i()dist
Ep'iscopal Church v. Linden, supra. (Owner of property in question a member of city council.)
4. The scanty and pedantic attempts of the
County to comply with the notice requirements of the
statute are constitutionally inadequate. (See discus·
sion in sections II and III, supra.) In fact, in reviewing
the actions of the County Commission it appears that
the attempts at "notice" were calculated not to in·
form or at most to misinform interested parties.

Had the County been discharging its duty to inform
homeowners in the area to be affected it would, among other
things, have
(i) required the applicant to supply names and
addresses of owners of property within 150 feet of the
.
subject property (as its
rules prov1.d e an d as all other

55
applicants for a change of zoning are required to do)
before proceeding with the application;
(ii) required the District Planning Commission to
have a chance to meet and discuss the change with
homeowners in the area before the Planning Commission acted (as is required for all other applicants);
(iii) required the District Planning Commission
to be fully staffed and capable of informing residents
in the area before proceeding (as the statute requires).

(iv) taken the normal amount of time required
to process an application, (usually three months),
rather than trying to rush it through to decision by
the lame-duck Commissioners before they left office;
·(v) required written proof by the applicant that
he owned the property or had a written power of attorney from all owners before proceeding with the application. (It was only 35 days between the time applicant purchased the property [and thereby had the
right to cause it to be rezoned] and the time he supposedly had it rezoned);
(vi) required a policing of the flimsy pieces of
paper which were tacked on utility poles to make certain that they were viewable for at least a reasonable
part of thirty days and were not torn off by applicant or some other person before the property owners
in the area had a chance to see them; and
(vii) required that the affidavit of publication
of notice given by the zoning staff be accurate and
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truthful.

The general flavor from the attempts of the prior
County Commission to do only what they thought the
notice statute required, and not one jot or tittle more, and
the outright refusal of the new County Commission to permit owners of dwellings in the affected area to present any
evidence can lead to only one conclusion - the County
Commissioners did not want to be put to the trouble of hear.
ing from owners of dwellings directly affected by their
acts; they were perfectly satisfied to follow archaic notice
procedures (such as publication of a legal description only
and posting on the west steps of the City and County
Building miles away from the subject property in the hope
that no affected property owner would learn about their
intended act and appear to oppose), notwithstanding that
civilization and methods of communication have taken great
leaps forward and almost everyone today reasonably ex·
pects to learn about important happenings via much faster,
simpler and easier methods of communication, such as by
a letter or by a phone call. Obviously the decision of the
prior Commission to destroy a residential neighborhood
by the intrusion of a pitifully small commercially zoned
spot is much easier to slip through if the owners of dwell·
ings do not learn about it; further, such action then makes
it possible for the new Commission to deftly hide from
realities and duck their responsibilities to dwelling owners
and taxpayers merely by saying to irate owners of homes
that no opposition appeared at the so-called hearing, the
prior Commission is to blame, and we're sorry - you had

57

your chance and we can do nothing about it. The flavor of
this kind of abdication of the responsibilities of government
to the general public when viewed as a whole, can lead to no
other conclusion than that both Commissions acted arbitrarily, capriciously, unreasonably and with reckless and
wanton disregard of the rights of owners of dwellings to be
informed of proposed zoning changes, to be heard impartially and to be treated fairly and forthrightly in
keeping with modern times and the comparative ease with
which at least adjoining property owners could be told about
the proposed change of zoning.
The conclusion is inescapable that each of the Commissions did not really want to be bothered - each wanted to
put this commercial island in the middle of a residential
area no matter who of the citizens was hurt, and as such
the actions of both Commissions cannot stand, being arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.
( e) The unreasonableness of defendants actions viti·
ates the legality of the rezoning.
In reviewing legislative acts the Court may properly
consider the over-all "reasonableness" of the exercise of
power. As stated in United States v. Abendon, 24 Philippine Report, 169 (1913):
Although ordinances may not contravene a constitution or statute and may be within the scope of
charter powers, yet, if they seem to the court oppressive, unfair, partial or discriminatory they are
declared unreasonable and void whether this appears
from their face or from proof aliunde. (Elliott
Municipal Corporation, 198-202; Lakeview v. Tate,
130 Ill. 247; Kip v. Peterson, 26 N.J.L. 298; Ex parte

58
Frank, 52 Cal. 606; Toney v. Macon, 119 Ga 83·
Carrollton v. Bazette, 159 Ill. 284; Mt. Vernon Ba~
v. Sarlls, 129 Ind. 201; State v. Mahner, 43 La. Ann.
496; Red Star Steamship Co. v. Jersey City 45 N.JL
246.)
'
''
Nothing could be more oppressive, unfair, discrimina.
tory and unreasonable than defendants County Commissioners refusal to permit affected home owners the right
to present their case before a body supposedly representing
their interest. Cf., Gayland v. Salt Lake County, 358 P.
2d at 636.
CONCLUSION
Defendants' actions were legally deficient as the notice requirements of the zoning statute were not complied
with; viz., there was no posting in a "public place"; at
most two, not three, notices were posted, none of the postings was "designed" to give notice; and the contents of
the various legal descriptions were inaccurate and insuffi.
cient. The aforementioned facts notwithstanding, the notice provision of section 17-27-17 deprived property owners
of their constitutional rights of due process. Finally, the
arbitrary and capricious acts of the various defendants were
violative of their respective duties and therefor invalid.
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